

# THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE BULLETIN

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## *In this issue*

### JAPAN'S MANDATED ISLANDS

*Article by George H. Blakeslee*

### THE FIRST PROGRESS REPORT OF THE JOINT SURVEY GROUP

*Article by Alan N. Steyne*



THE DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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# Dumbarton Oaks Proposals

## STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

[Released to the press December 15]

On October 9, 1944 the Dumbarton Oaks proposals were made available to the peoples of the world for full study and discussion. Popular response has been spontaneous and general in many countries. It has been a source of encouragement to all who share our conviction that this people's war must lead to a people's peace unless we are again to be deprived of the fruits of victory.

I am particularly gratified by the understanding and vigor with which the proposals have been discussed and continue to be debated by our own people. Much of that discussion has been fostered by organized groups of citizens conscious of their responsibility to promote public understanding of the great national and international issues which confront us. Not only organizations specialized in the study of international relations, but business, labor, and farm groups, service clubs and

associations of ex-servicemen, women's organizations and religious societies, professional associations and groups of educators are spreading an understanding of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals throughout the country. By their work these organizations are making one of the most important contributions that can be made at this time toward the establishment of a strong and workable international organization in which our country will have an active share commensurate with its position as a world power.

These organized efforts to promote a clear understanding of the proposed international organization for the maintenance of peace promise well for the future. It is only through public discussion, knowledge, and understanding that the peace to come can rest upon firm foundations of popular support and participation—and thus be truly a people's peace.

## ADDRESS BY JOSEPH C. GREW<sup>1</sup>

[Released to the press December 13]

"Army and Navy leaders are agreed that, if any aggressor again attempts world conquest, this nation will be attacked first of all. We shall be hit suddenly, by surprise, and hard. We can never again expect that other nations will take the first shock and hold off the enemy until we can arm.

"The reason is plain. We have twice shown the world that we have greater war power than any other nation on earth when given time to mobilize it. So a future aggressor's first goal must be to crush us before he attacks anyone else; and not give us what we have always needed in other emergencies—time.

"Such a blow has become possible. We are no longer out of reach. Today's airplanes cross

oceans on routine operations. Tomorrow the B-29—which can drop a big bomb load on targets 1,000 miles distant and come home—will be superseded by planes with much longer range, dropping more powerful bombs. Planes dragging gliders laden with airborne troops will be able to fly from Europe or Asia and land men to seize Pittsburgh steel mills or the Mississippi River bridges. In the foreseeable future are improved invasion craft which could land troops and supplies on our coasts. There will be robot bombs of . . . greater accuracy, launched from planes, from carriers, from islands—perhaps even from other continents. We may be struck out of the blue by lightnings we did not know existed.

"Our geographical position can no longer be considered a protection," says Secretary of War Stimson."

The foregoing quotation is from an article in the December issue of the *Reader's Digest* by Thomas

<sup>1</sup> Delivered at a meeting sponsored by the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations and the Chicago Association of Commerce on Dec. 13, 1944. Broadcast over the Columbia Broadcasting System.



M. Johnson, who has been a close student of military affairs since the last war. I think it deserves the most thoughtful attention of our people. The article is entitled "The Military Essentials for Our Postwar Safety", and it contains proposals for America's preparedness in the years ahead.

I believe implicitly in the importance of military and naval preparedness. I have always believed in it and have fully and frequently gone on record to that effect. I believe in it now more than ever. But I believe in two kinds of preparedness—preparedness for war and preparedness for the maintenance of peace. If history has taught us nothing else, it has shown us beyond peradventure that, if human nature is allowed to run its normal course uncurbed, peace cannot and will not be maintained. Preparedness there must be, and curbs there must be, if world peace and security are to be insured. Throughout history, mankind has tried to set up effective peace machinery. China tried it some 500 years before Christ; Greece tried it; Rome tried it; William Penn proposed in effect a United States of Europe in which all states would submit their differences to a world court of arbitration and would promptly act together to crush an aggressor. Yet all failed, and finally even the creation of the League of Nations and the Kellogg-Briand pact failed to prevent war. Why did they fail? They failed because these peace plans were superficial. They were like poultices prescribed for cancer. This time *we cannot afford to fail*.

Now in erecting our future peace structure, we must have in mind two fundamental considerations: First, the structure must overcome the flaws and weaknesses of the ineffective machinery of the past; second, we cannot hope to erect *effective* machinery unless we, as a nation, are willing to make what in the past has been considered sacrifices. I do not mean a sacrifice of sovereignty. The thought of fashioning any kind of superstate is to us wholly repugnant, and no such thought or plan has entered or can enter our counsels. But we must be prepared to pool our efforts and a part of our armed forces—if that be considered a sacrifice—not only for the *common good but for the future security of our own nation and our own people*. Is that too great a sacrifice to avoid the horrors of another war, waged with the terrific and as yet unimagined instruments that will certainly be used if war comes to us and to other

nations again in another generation, with its certain devastation and the certain destruction once again of the flower of our manhood, probably including the blotting out of our cities and of a percentage of our civil population from which reason recoils? These awful visions sound fantastic. But they are not fantastic. With the constantly accelerating developments in science, especially military science and electric science, these are precisely the things that could and probably would occur in a world war of the future. Can any sacrifice be too great to avoid *that* sort of cataclysm?

We must have one further consideration in mind. With the best efforts and the best will in the world, we cannot hope to prepare a blueprint for our future peace machinery that will be wholly satisfying to everybody. Human nature and international nature being what they are, the best we can do is to aim for the maximum of what is desirable within the scope of what is attainable and be prepared to accept the nearest approach to that maximum that will permit general and eventually, we hope, universal acceptance. We and other nations should be prepared to accept the net result of our combined endeavors only if that result holds out a fair promise to be *effective* in the maintenance of future world peace and security. Criticism and debate there is bound to be, for the net result cannot possibly please everybody, and criticism and debate are to be welcomed just so long as they are helpfully constructive. It is for the very purpose of inviting constructive criticism and debate that we have published the results of the preliminary talks at Dumbarton Oaks in anticipation of a United Nations conference. But if the blueprint that emerges from the eventual United Nations conference offers a workable machine holding out a reasonable hope for the prevention of future wars, a machine that can be improved and gradually, we hope, perfected with matured experience and the wisdom of enlightened statesmanship, we cannot afford, as in 1920, once again to retire into our shell and refuse to cooperate just because what we might consider to be a perfect instrument has not been produced. We must give it a fair chance to succeed. Unless all the major powers play their full part it will be obvious that the plan cannot succeed. But I am very hopeful that the merits and the power of whatever instrument eventually emerges will commend itself to the great majority of our people,



whose thinking has undergone a vast transformation since 1920.

Before discussing the Dumbarton Oaks proposals, let us consider certain aspects of their development. You will recall that in the Four Nation Declaration signed at the Moscow Conference in 1943 the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the Republic of China pledged themselves to take the leadership in the creation of a permanent international organization for the maintenance of peace and security. It was understood at that time, as well as at Dumbarton Oaks, that any such organization would be based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all peace-loving nations and open to membership by all such nations. The next step after Moscow was to determine how far the four signatories of that Declaration were prepared to go—what obligations they would undertake—what responsibilities they were prepared to assume. Before undertaking to bring about a wider and more general understanding as to the responsibilities which would need to be assumed by all peace-loving nations in the interests of peace, they had to agree among themselves, and it should be borne in mind that these four countries, because of their size and strength, can make or break any system of general security.

On the basis of this thought, preparations for the Dumbarton Oaks meeting were undertaken by each of the four Governments. Under the leadership of Secretary Hull, who unsparingly devoted his time and his energy to the direction of our own preparations for these conversations, there emerged a set of proposals which this Government placed before the other three Governments. In this preparation, full account was taken of the experiences of the past, particularly that of the inter-war period. More than that, we undertook to assemble and analyze all ideas and suggestions, both official and private, at home and abroad, which threw light on the problems involved. When this initial work was completed, the ideas which emerged were then discussed with many members of both Houses of Congress and with numerous leaders of national thought. Thus prepared, as were the representatives of the other three Governments, it was possible, as President Roosevelt has said, that "so much could have been accomplished on so difficult a subject in so short a time".

But in spite of all this preparation, very little

could have been accomplished at Dumbarton Oaks had it not been for the constructive and cooperative spirit which animated the discussions. The men who met there labored patiently and hopefully in their endeavor to reach an agreement based on a genuine understanding. I wish to say, for my part, that in the many international conferences in which I have participated during the past 40 years I have never experienced such a seriousness of purpose, nor such a sense of responsibility, as that displayed at Dumbarton Oaks.

This is all by way of preamble. Now I shall get down to brass tacks and shall discuss with you the provisional blueprint produced at Dumbarton Oaks and the considerations underlying the more important provisions in the plan. Please remember that while at Dumbarton, we merely erected something to shoot at; the plan that was produced, nevertheless, represents the best results of the combined thinking of our British, Russian, and Chinese friends, as well as our own. It is a plan which combines our idealistic aims with the realities of the world in which we live today.

The Organization envisaged in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals may be conceived as having three principal purposes, each of which is related to the single aim of maintaining peace and security. The long-range purpose and objective is to assist in the creation of those conditions of stability and well-being in the international community which will be conducive to the maintenance of peace. Secondly, the Organization would facilitate peaceful means of adjustment or settlement of disputes between nations, which, if permitted to continue, might result in a breach of the peace. Finally, if peaceful means failed, and a threat to or breach of the peace occurred, the Organization would take such forceful action as might be required to maintain or restore peace.

For the accomplishment of these purposes, different types of organs exercising different types of functions would be required. The Dumbarton Oaks plan provides for a General Assembly, with an Economic and Social Council under its authority, a Security Council, an international court of justice, and a secretariat. To those versed in the structure of the League of Nations, this enumeration may sound familiar. Undoubtedly, there are some features which the United Nations would have in common with the former League. However, there are two fundamental differences which in my opinion constitute a great advance

over the League. In the first place, the Dumbarton Oaks proposals assign to each of the principal organs of the Organization clear-cut *responsibilities*, thereby eliminating any confusion as to jurisdiction. In the second place, each organ is endowed with appropriate powers for the discharge of its functions. These observations relate especially to the proposed General Assembly and the Security Council.

The General Assembly is to be the central organ of the Organization, in which all member states, large and small, would be represented on an equal footing and would enjoy equal responsibilities. In this body, the truly democratic character of the structure would be reflected. The General Assembly would be the center for international discussion and action with respect to cooperation in political, economic, and social questions generally. It would be expected to review the state of relations among nations and make recommendations to governments for the promotion of their cooperative efforts. It would be responsible for promoting the observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. It would also consider and make recommendations regarding the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security, including those governing disarmament and the regulation of armaments. In short, the General Assembly would be the arm of the Organization which would promote its long-range objectives for the advancement of human freedom and progress. It would not be in any sense a legislative body or any agency of a super-state but rather an instrumentality to facilitate agreement among states for the advancement of their common aims.

It is evident from all this that the wide scope of the subjects with which the General Assembly of the proposed Organization will be concerned indicates that its activities will cover the whole range of political, economic, and social problems of interest to the international community. Moreover, the General Assembly would be able to approach these constructive tasks without being encumbered by responsibilities for the solution of specific conflicts or the specific implementation of policies which can better be achieved by specialized bodies and agencies.

But constructive activity such as that entrusted to the Assembly would be greatly impaired if conditions of insecurity prevailed. Hence the

Dumbarton Oaks proposals place great emphasis on the powers and procedures to be employed for the maintenance of peace and security. These powers would be vested in the Security Council. This Council would be a small body of 11 members which would be in continuous session, alert and ready for any emergency. Of the 11 members, the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union, China, and eventually France would have permanent seats. It is clear that the economic strength and military potential of these countries place them in a position of special responsibility in any matter relating to peace and security. Realistic recognition is given this fact in according them permanent seats on the Security Council.

The other six members of the Council would be elected by the General Assembly for two-year terms. And I would like to point out here that, whatever voting procedure may be agreed to, decisions in the Security Council would certainly require the assent of one or more of these members.

As I have said before, one of the purposes of the Organization would be to facilitate the peaceful adjustment and settlement of disputes. This function would devolve on the Security Council, which would act in accordance with a series of procedures outlined in the proposals. Nations directly involved in any disputes would bear the initial responsibility and obligation for adjusting or settling such disputes peacefully by means of their own choice. Such means might include direct negotiation, mediation, arbitration, or adjudication by the court of international justice. However, the Council would be empowered to investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, in order to determine whether or not international peace was endangered. If the parties to a dispute failed to settle their differences by such means, they would be obligated to refer it to the Security Council. The Security Council would then determine whether the dispute was likely to endanger peace, and if so, recommend procedures or methods of adjustment.

There is thus a dual responsibility in these proposed measures. On the one hand, the parties to the dispute must observe their obligations to find peaceful solutions, and on the other hand, the Security Council must be ever alert to determine when a dispute may constitute a threat to the peace.

But if all these procedures should fail, and the Council should find that the peace was threatened,



it would be empowered to take any measures necessary for the maintenance of peace.

The provisions for enforcement action by the Security Council are sufficiently elastic for effective action, whenever such action is required. Although wide discretion is given the Council in the determination of the existence of a threat to or breach of the peace, its action must be taken in accordance with the principles of the charter. Initially such action might consist of measures not involving the use of armed force, such as the severance of diplomatic and economic relations and the interruption of rail, sea, air, postal, radio, and other means of communication. If necessary, however, the Council could take action by air, naval, and land forces to restore peace.

Let me here recapitulate in somewhat greater detail the several successive steps that under the Dumbarton Oaks plan are open to the Security Council for the maintenance of peace and security, because these steps are of fundamental importance in the proposed structure:

1. The Security Council can investigate any dispute or any situation which may lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute.

2. It can call upon the parties to a dispute to seek a solution by negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, or judicial settlement, or by any other peaceful means of their own choice, or it can recommend appropriate procedures or methods of adjustment.

Up to this point, it will be seen that the successive steps open to the Council are of a judicial nature. Only if these several steps have failed to settle the dispute in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organization and only if the dispute is found to constitute a continuing threat to the peace is the Council empowered to proceed to further steps of a political nature.

3. If the means already described fail and if the Security Council determines that, as a result, there exists a threat to the peace, it can decide whether it should take action.

4. If the Council decides in the affirmative, it can then determine the measures to be taken to maintain or restore peace and security.

5. The Council can take diplomatic, economic, or other measures short of the use of armed force, these measures envisaging possible complete or partial interruption of communications and the severance of diplomatic and economic relations.

6. Finally, but only in the last analysis if all previous steps have been found inadequate is the Council empowered to take such action by air, naval, or land forces as may be necessary to maintain or restore international peace and security.

Clearly, under the proposed plan, every possible effort is to be made to settle international disputes without recourse to the use of force, but force is to be available if only thus can international peace and security be maintained or restored.

Now, for this last purpose, and under special agreements concluded in keeping with their constitutional processes, the member states of the United Nations would be obligated to supply, in case of need, specified contingents of armed forces and other facilities to be used for the maintenance of peace. These special agreements for the supply of forces would be concluded among member states and would be subject to approval by the Security Council.

It is obvious that in the use of armed forces by the Security Council it would require the most highly qualified expert assistance for this purpose. For this reason, the proposals provide for the creation of a Military Staff Committee which would consist of the Chiefs of Staffs of the permanent members of the Council or of their representatives and of other members of the Organization in special circumstances. This Committee would serve the Security Council not only in military enforcement measures but also in advising the Council upon a general system for the effective regulation of armaments.

This, in brief, is the pattern proposed for the maintenance of peace. There is, however, one further aspect which I wish to emphasize. I refer to the solemn obligations which must be assumed by all members of the Organization. First, they must pledge themselves to resort to none but peaceful means in the settlement of any disputes which may arise among them. As a fundamental corollary to this obligation, they must also pledge themselves to refrain from the use of force or the threat of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organization. In the event of a breach of the peace, all members must obligate themselves to assist the Organization in any action taken by it to maintain or restore peace. I trust that you will agree with me that these obligations go considerably farther than those assumed by the parties to the Kellogg pact and by the members of the



League of Nations. These obligations, together with the extensive power of the Security Council to decide upon measures to be taken in the event of a breach of the peace, therefore would mark a great step forward in our ceaseless efforts to find means of preventing war.

In discussing the role of the General Assembly, I passed lightly over the provisions of the proposals concerning the solution of economic, social, and humanitarian problems. These provisions, in my opinion, merit your attention. As I have said before, the General Assembly would have responsibility for the formulation of broad policies in these fields in the form of recommendations. An Economic and Social Council, under the authority of the General Assembly, would assist that body in developing international cooperative activity in the economic and social fields. This Council would consist of 18 member states elected by the General Assembly for a term of 3 years. Unlike the Security Council, no provision is made for permanent members. It may be anticipated, however, that in selecting the members of the Economic and Social Council the General Assembly would take into consideration their ability to contribute to its work.

In considering the functions of the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council, I invite your attention to the extensive development of a number of specialized economic and social agencies. Some of these, such as the International Labor Office, were established at the close of the last war. Others developed during the inter-war period. However, within the past 18 months 4 new organizations have been projected as a result of the international conferences held at Hot Springs, Bretton Woods, and Chicago. These newly projected bodies include the United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization, the International Monetary Fund, the International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, and the International Civil Aviation Organization. Still other organizations may be established to deal with specialized economic, social, and cultural questions, as for example the proposed United Nations Organization for Educational and Cultural Reconstruction. I should add to the above list the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration, popularly referred to as UNRRA, which is in a special position because of its temporary nature.

The Dumbarton Oaks proposals contemplate

that specialized agencies, such as those just described, would be brought into relationship with the general organization so that their policies and activities might be coordinated and related in the over-all picture. This coordination is considered necessary to prevent overlapping and confusion. The responsibility for such coordination would be placed in the highest representative body of the world—the General Assembly; but it would fall to the Economic and Social Council, under its authority, to work out the practical problems involved in such a program.

The Economic and Social Council would be assisted by a series of expert commissions, for economic problems, for social problems, and for any other group of problems, which might be required in this field. An economic commission, for example, served by a highly trained staff, might develop into a sort of international economic general staff in connection with the world organization.

Let me remind you that in this area the Organization would act through recommendations both to governments and to the specialized agencies. It seems likely, however, that recommendations made by the General Assembly or by the Economic and Social Council on the basis of informed and careful preparation by such a staff would command wide attention and respect. This would surely give a very real impetus to effective solution of difficult and complicated, but immensely important, economic and social problems. Its fundamental purpose would be to create conditions under which international disputes would be less likely to arise.

This then is the general plan of the international organization proposed at Dumbarton Oaks. But at least three more steps need to be taken for the effective establishment of the structure. The first would be to negotiate its charter, which would set forth the obligations to be assumed by member states and the basic machinery of the Organization. The second step would be to negotiate an agreement or a series of agreements for the provision by member states of armed forces and facilities for use by the Security Council. The third step would be to negotiate agreements for the regulation of armaments, looking toward a reduction of the heavy burden of armaments. Each of these instruments would be subject to approval by each of the nations involved, in accordance with its constitutional processes. Upon the completion of

these negotiations there would emerge a flexible machinery of organized international relations fully capable of development and growth. No machinery made by man will in itself provide security. *But if the peace-loving nations of the world are firmly resolved to establish such machinery and if they have the sustained will to use and to support it, the proposed Organization would doubtless, we believe, represent a tremendous advance in our modern world.*

Now before closing I venture, purely by way of illustration, to indulge in one or two personal reminiscences which may indicate why I am so profoundly happy to have been associated with the work at Dumbarton Oaks. In 1898, I remember, as a youth, the outbreak of our war with Spain. It was the sinking of the *Maine* that caused the long smoldering resentment of our people to blaze into war, but our differences with Spain were of long duration and of cumulative intensity. Did not the continuance of those differences endanger the maintenance of international peace long, long before war occurred, and would not those differences have been dealt with by such an international body as we now visualize in order to allay that threat in the interests of all?

In 1907 I watched from St. Petersburg the gathering clouds of eventual war. In 1910 and 1911 I saw from Vienna the gradual development of the irritation that resulted in the Balkan wars, and from then until 1914 I watched, from Berlin, the steadily mounting danger of the first World War. At Lausanne in 1923 I was fortunate, by an all-night conference alternately with Mr. Venizelos and General Ismet Pasha, now President of the Turkish Republic, in securing the reciprocal concessions which helped to stave off war between Turkey and Greece, which were then on the very threshold of renewed hostilities owing to a long series of mutual irritations. And then in Tokyo during the 10 years from 1932 to 1941 I watched, impotently, the development of the arrogant and aggressive militarism that had led to the invasion of Manchuria in 1931 and that soon brought about the invasion of North China in 1937 and ultimately the attack on Pearl Harbor in 1941.

With such a background is it surprising that the following thoughts found expression in my diary in 1933:

"Our peace machinery while magnificent in theory is ineffective in practice. It is ineffective

because it is superficial. It is like a poultice prescribed for cancer by the surgeon long after the cancer has been allowed to develop. Most of our international ills closely resemble the ravages of cancer. They generally begin on a small scale as a result of long irritation on a given spot. Even the most skillful physician may not be able to sense the irritation in advance, but the moment the obvious symptoms appear, he seeks to eradicate the disease by treatment long before operation becomes necessary.

"The future peace machinery of the world must go one step further than the physician. It must sense the spots of irritation and diagnose the future potentialities of disease and attempt treatment long before the disease itself materializes. . . .

"To put the matter in a nutshell, the peace machinery of the world must be far more radical, far more prescient, far more concerned with facts, conditions and circumstances than with theories than it is today if it is ever to succeed in abolishing war. . . .

"Some day in the distant future we shall have, perhaps, a sort of Faculty of International Political Health who will study international relationships from every point of view, much as the family physician studies, or should study, the mental, physical, and moral condition of his individual charges. When sources of potential danger to international health are perceived, the Faculty will prescribe, long before the actual illness occurs, in order to eliminate the causes of potential friction, the sources of infection. The curative measures must be taken long, long before the disease has been given an opportunity to grow. In international affairs, once the fever of animosity has appeared, avoidance of the disease is uncertain; it may be too late. The prophylactic steps must be taken in time. Much can be done around a green table in a definite case by the sober judgment of a few far-sighted statesmen long before public opinion has had a chance to become inflamed and their own saner judgment warped by the course of events and by the heat of international animosity.

"This Faculty of International Political Health—a vision of the future (and let me label it as purely a phantasy of my own mind)—must sit constantly, conducting research as in any lab-

(Continued on page 756)

ADDRESS BY LEO PASVOLSKY<sup>1</sup>

[Released to the press December 16]

The Dumbarton Oaks proposals deal with the problem of organized international action for the maintenance of world peace and security and for the advancement of the material and cultural well-being of individuals and of nations. These two great factors of human progress are closely inter-related. The advancement of material and cultural well-being requires a state of affairs in which progress will not be interrupted by wars or impaired by preparations for war. Yet, in the interdependent world of today, whatever arrangements might be set up for the prevention of wars and the elimination of preparations for war will necessarily be precarious and uncertain unless there exist adequate arrangements for collaborative action in the solution of economic and social problems.

One of the great lessons of the recent unhappy past is that it is entirely possible to have, in a period of political and military peace, a condition of violent and destructive economic warfare. That was precisely the situation in which the world found itself during the two uneasy inter-war decades, in spite of many efforts to reverse the trend. It would obviously be an exaggeration to say that the second World War was caused solely by the condition of international economic strife which prevailed in the twenties and even more virulently in the thirties. There were, of course, many other decisive elements in mankind's fatal drift toward the catastrophe of another world war. But it is not too much to say that, so long as international economic relations remained in the state in which they were in the recent decades, both peace and prosperity were forlorn hopes, and the fatal drift toward disaster could not be arrested.

With this recent experience starkly before them, the representatives of the four Governments who met at Dumbarton Oaks sought to fashion a set of proposals which would take into account all of the main factors involved in the task of maintaining international peace and security and of promoting human progress. In the document which emerged

from their meeting, that task is regarded as being of a two-fold character.

First, it is necessary that the nations of the world assume a solemn obligation to resort to none but peaceful means in the settlement of whatever controversies or disputes that may arise among them and in the adjustment of any situations and conditions that may lead to friction or disputes among them. Accordingly, they must assume an obligation not to use armed force or threat of force for these purposes. Having assumed these obligations, they must join together in creating arrangements whereby the peaceful settlement of disputes and the adjustment of conditions which may threaten the peace or security of nations may be facilitated and made effective. They must also join together in combined action to remove threats to the peace and to suppress breaches of the peace—by armed force, if all other means fail.

Second, it is necessary that the nations of the world recognize that disputes, controversies, and frictions among them are less likely to occur if they work together in creating conditions conducive to stability and well-being within nations and, therefore, essential to the maintenance of stable and peaceful relations among nations. They must join together in creating arrangements for facilitating the solution of international economic, social, humanitarian, and related problems and for cooperative action in promoting the type of international relations which is necessary for material and cultural progress.

These are the two great purposes of the international organization outlined in the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. They define its scope and indicate the kind of institutional structure that is necessary for their attainment.

It is proposed that the Organization should be open to membership by all peace-loving states. It is proposed that there should be a General Assembly in which all member states would be represented on an entirely equal footing. There should also be a Security Council, a smaller body, in part elected periodically by the General Assembly.

The General Assembly would be the focal point for international discussion and action with respect to the second of the two great purposes which I have just outlined—the creation of conditions

<sup>1</sup> Delivered at the American Labor Conference on International Affairs, at New York, N. Y., on Dec. 16, 1944. Mr. Pasvolsky is Special Assistant to the Secretary of State.



of stability and well-being essential to the preservation of a peaceful world order. The Security Council would be the focal point for the attaining of the first great purpose—the peaceful settlement of disputes, the removal of threats to the peace, and the suppression of breaches of the peace. In my talk this morning, I shall deal primarily with the proposed General Assembly and with its functions, especially in the field of economic and social cooperation.

The General Assembly, it is proposed, would meet annually or more frequently as special circumstances require. It would be charged with the task of reviewing the state of relations among nations and of making recommendations to the nations as regards the advancement of their cooperative effort in the improvement of political, economic, social, humanitarian, and other relationships and in the promotion of observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms. It would be free to consider any questions that concern relations among nations, including those which arise out of problems of peace and security and out of international cooperation in the solution of international problems and in the promotion of human freedom and human progress. It would not be in any sense a legislative body or an agency of a super-state. It would rather be an instrumentality for common and agreed action by a free association of nations.

The General Assembly would be empowered to create any agencies which it may find necessary for the performance of its tasks. The most important of such agencies is provided for in the proposals themselves. It is the Economic and Social Council which would operate under the authority of the Assembly and would perform functions of far-reaching importance.

In the vast and complicated field of economic, social, and related activities, there is a great need, now more widely recognized than ever, for specialized functional agencies and arrangements to deal effectively and intensively with particular types of activities. Some such agencies and arrangements were set up during the inter-war years, and even before. Their creation and utilization was an important part of the efforts to arrest the course of economic war. The International Labor Organization; the various commissions and committees of the League of Nations in the fields of economic, financial, transportation, and social problems; the International Institute of Agricul-

ture; the Bank for International Settlements; the Institute of Intellectual Cooperation were among conspicuous examples of such agencies. They were all useful, but not sufficiently effective, even when supplemented by various international conferences and by such far-reaching developments as our trade-agreements program and the Tripartite Declaration on currency problems. There were not enough such agencies; many of them were inherently weak; and no machinery existed for their effective coordination and stimulation.

For the past two years, the United Nations and certain other nations associated with them in the prosecution of the war have been making great forward strides toward the establishment of new specialized agencies or toward strengthening the existing ones. The conference at Hot Springs in May 1943 resulted in a plan for an international food and agriculture organization on a much broader basis than the Rome Institute of Agriculture. The Labor Conferences in New York and Philadelphia have laid plans for enlarging the usefulness of the International Labor Organization. A conference in London in the spring of this year brought forward plans for an eventual creation of an international agency for educational and cultural cooperation, again on a broader basis than the Institute of Intellectual Cooperation. The conference at Bretton Woods in July of this year resulted in projects for the establishment of an International Monetary Fund and of an International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, new agencies of far-reaching importance in these great fields. The international conference in Chicago, just concluded, has brought forward proposals for cooperative action in the solution of problems of civil aviation. Plans are being worked out for similar action in the fields of trade, commodities, cartels, other forms of transportation, communication, health, and others.

These are great steps toward the creation of a system of organized international relations in those fields in which satisfactory progress is impossible except on the basis of effective international cooperation. But the fact that a number of such specialized agencies is being brought into existence itself raises a problem. Unless the policies and activities of these agencies are coordinated into a coherent whole from the point of view of the over-all picture and of general welfare, their operations may result in overlapping and confusion and, consequently, in impairment of

the efficacy of each of them. In order to meet this great need for coordination it is now proposed to place the responsibility for such coordination in the General Assembly and, under it, in the Economic and Social Council.

It is, however, not to be anticipated that by the time the international organization is created there will be a specialized agency in every field in which it will be desirable to have such an agency. There may be many fields in which a specialized agency may not be feasible. Hence, the General Assembly and its Economic and Social Council must also engage in promoting cooperation in those fields in which specialized agencies do not already exist, in facilitating the creation of such agencies where they are feasible, and in over-all coordination in the whole realm of constructive international cooperation.

It is proposed that the Economic and Social Council should consist of representatives of eighteen countries, elected every three years by the General Assembly. Neither it nor the Assembly would have any executive functions in the sense that their decisions would be binding upon either the specialized agencies which it coordinates or upon the member governments. The thought is that in this area the international organization should not go beyond the powers of recommendation and should leave to the member states themselves the carrying out of such recommendations, except in such respects as the members of the Organization may request it to assist them more fully.

There were important and, to those of us who worked on the problem, cogent reasons for placing the basic responsibility in these fields in the General Assembly, rather than in a smaller body, the Economic and Social Council, and for giving the Assembly and the Council recommendatory rather than executive powers.

The specialized functional agencies already in existence or in contemplation will be fully representative bodies in the sense that each of them will be based on a wide membership. Hence, it would scarcely be appropriate to assign the task of coordinating their policies and activities to a less representative body, the Economic and Social Council. Yet, the Assembly, a large body meeting at infrequent intervals, will hardly be an effective instrumentality for the task of carrying out its great responsibility. Hence, it is our thought that the Economic and Social Council would be

the active agency of the Organization in these respects, but that it would operate within the framework of policies laid down by the highest representative body in the world and with the backing of that body's authority and prestige. And the Assembly would be the place where really important conflicts and problems would be resolved.

The specialized agencies will necessarily differ in scope and power. Some of them will be operative in character. Some will be promotive and recommendatory. The Dumbarton Oaks proposals envisage that the terms on which they would be brought into relation with the general organization may differ according to their respective character and that, therefore, these terms would be determined by agreement between the Organization and each agency. Some of these agreements may provide for close integration, some for a looser connection.

In any event, it is not anticipated that at this stage it would be either possible or desirable to place them under the control of the general organization. A system of organized international relations must grow and develop, and the machinery established for stimulating its growth must be flexible and capable of adaptation to changing conditions. A technique of systematic and centralized investigation and analysis used as a basis of recommendations for action should be admirably suited to the end in view.

To provide for systematic study and analysis, it is proposed that there be set up under the Economic and Social Council a series of commissions for economic problems, for social problems, for educational problems, and so forth. These commissions would consist of experts in each of the fields and would have attached to them highly competent research staffs. Each commission would be responsible for the collection and analysis of information relating to its particular field and would act, with respect to its field, as an authoritative advisory body for the Economic and Social Council and for the General Assembly.

There is a provision that representatives of the specialized agencies would participate without vote in the deliberations of the Economic and Social Council and of its commissions whenever matters of concern to them are under discussion. It may be found desirable for the Council or its commissions to maintain additional contact with

the specialized agencies through their own representatives at the respective headquarters of the various agencies.

It is hoped that in all these ways there would be created, in connection with the world organization, a sort of an international economic and social general staff. And it seems more than likely that recommendations made by the General Assembly or by the Economic and Social Council on the basis of informed and careful preparation by such a staff would command sufficient attention and respect to provide a very real impetus to effective solution of difficult and complicated, but immensely important, problems of economic and social advancement.

There is one other important function of the Economic and Social Council that should be mentioned. It is proposed that the Council itself, as well as its commissions and staffs, should assist the Security Council, both in the latter's investigation of conditions or situations which may lead to international friction and disputes and in the application of economic measures which may be

utilized in connection with the maintenance of peace and security.

Our problem today and our great responsibility is to see to it that after this war the world will be spared, as it was not spared after the last war, the ravages of disruptive and destructive economic strife and of another world war. The kind of machinery that is proposed in the Dumbarton Oaks document is indispensable for this purpose. Without this much, at least, the future will be dark, indeed. But no machinery, however well constructed, can by itself guarantee peace and insure progress. Our nation and other nations must be resolved to establish an effective international organization and a structure of specialized agencies for international cooperation, to use them, and to act in accordance with the obligations assumed by virtue of membership in them. If they do this, mankind will have made a tremendous advance toward the realization of its age-old dream of a warless world and toward an increasing measure of success in its continuing search for economic, social, and cultural betterment.

### ADDRESS BY DURWARD V. SANDIFER<sup>1</sup>

[Released to the press December 12]

It is both an honor and a pleasure to have the opportunity of appearing here tonight to discuss with this distinguished group of lawyers the Dumbarton Oaks proposals for the establishment of an international organization for the maintenance of peace and security.

I want first to emphasize that the Dumbarton Oaks proposals are the joint product of the thought and study of the responsible officials of the four governments represented at Dumbarton Oaks. The delegations met at Dumbarton Oaks only after each of their governments had completed painstaking and thorough preparations and after preliminary views had been exchanged. We in the State Department had been carrying on intensive research and discussion for over two years, with the wise guidance and under the active leadership of President Roosevelt and Secretary Hull. As you know, the opinion was expressed in some quarters that each of the four governments

should publish separate official plans for the Organization in advance of the Conversations. However, all four governments were in agreement that it was important to enter the preliminary conversations without official commitments to separate plans. In this way no one of the delegations was bound to a single set of proposals.

From my personal observation at Dumbarton Oaks I can testify to the free give-and-take attitude and to the fine cooperative spirit that invariably prevailed there. The inevitable differences of views on specific points were ironed out through days and weeks of frank and patient discussion, and a truly joint product was developed. I believe the encouraging results of these preliminary conversations have borne out the wisdom of the procedure adopted.

The Dumbarton Oaks proposals have now been before the public for more than two months, and full discussion and study of them is well under way. It cannot be repeated too often that such discussion is of vital importance in order that the governments of all the states concerned may know how far their people are willing to go in support of a system for the maintenance of international

<sup>1</sup>Delivered at a meeting of the Bar Association of the city of New York on Dec. 12, 1944. Mr. Sandifer is Acting Chief, Division of International Security and Organization, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State.



peace and security. I know of no group having greater responsibility or capacity for participation in that discussion both by direct contribution and by leadership in the communities from which you severally come. Most of you have already been active in both respects, and I can assure you that your contributions to the clarification of the proposals are welcomed by those responsible for their preparation for presentation to the general conference of states.

As you gentlemen are no doubt by now familiar with the general outline and content of the proposals, I believe we can most profitably give special attention to certain features of particular constitutional or legal interest.

## I

A unique feature of the proposals is that they contain in the body of the text in chapters I and II a statement of the purposes and principles of the projected Organization. Material of this character would normally be included in a preamble in the form of introductory or background matter and as a statement of aspirations.

It was the feeling of the draftsmen of this document that the purposes and principles as here formulated constitute the very basis of the Organization and that they should be made an integral part of the charter of the Organization. Their force should not be dissipated through relegation to a preamble. They represent controlling standards for action by the organs of the Organization. For example, it is provided that measures taken by the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security should be in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organization.

Furthermore, a blueprint of the basic structure and scope of the Organization is to be found within the four corners of the statement of purposes:

"1. To maintain international peace and security; and to that end to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means adjustment or settlement of international disputes which may lead to a breach of the peace;

"2. To develop friendly relations among nations

and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;

"3. To achieve international cooperation in the solution of international economic, social, and other humanitarian problems; and

"4. To afford a center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the achievement of these common ends."

The essential character and the guidelines of the action of the Organization are laid down in the statement of principles:

1. The sovereign equality of all peace-loving states.

2. The assurance to all members of the rights and benefits resulting from membership in the Organization through the fulfilment of the obligations assumed by the members in accordance with the charter.

3. The settlement of disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered.

4. All members to refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organization.

5. Every assistance to the Organization by all members in any action undertaken by it in accordance with the provisions of the charter.

6. All members to refrain from giving assistance to any state against which preventive or enforcement action is being undertaken by the Organization.

## II

The proposals state merely the basic concept of membership in the Organization, leaving further details for elaboration in the charter. "Membership of the Organization", it is stated, "should be open to all peace-loving states". This means an original limited membership, with an aspiration to universality. I say universality advisedly for I believe that the whole Organization is built upon the concept of development of the basis of friendly relations among all nations. The continued maintenance of general peace and security has as the goal of its ultimate achievement bringing all states within the Organization.

It was considered impracticable to base the Organization in the beginning upon the principle, advocated by some, of universal membership co-extensive with the community of nations. How-

ever, it was recognized that in order to carry out its purpose of maintaining international peace and security, the Organization must be in a position to exercise some control over states not originally included as members. So it is provided that the Organization should ensure that states not members act in accordance with the principles of the Organization "so far as may be necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security". That means that such states would be required to settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that peace and security are not endangered; that they shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any way which would endanger international peace and security; that they should refrain from giving assistance to any state against which preventive or enforcement action is being taken by the Organization, if such assistance would endanger peace and security. This, as you can readily see, is a rule of far-reaching consequence, but one essential to the effective functioning of the Organization.

Provision is made, as you know, for the admission of new members by the General Assembly upon recommendation of the Security Council.

### III

Another feature of the proposals which has great importance and interest both from a practical and constitutional point of view is the differentiation of power between the General Assembly and the Security Council. This derives from the effort to create an effective instrumentality for the enforcement of security and peace. As a prerequisite to the lodging of effective executive power of enforcement action in the Organization, it was considered essential to create a representative organ of limited membership and to confer principal responsibility upon it for carrying out enforcement action. The need for such a differentiation of authority was clearly indicated by the experience of the League of Nations, in which the Council and the Assembly had fully concurrent powers.

This concentration of authority over enforcement action in the Security Council should not be permitted to obscure the nature and importance of the powers assigned to the General Assembly. In the field of action for the maintenance of peace and security which is the Security Council's primary responsibility, the General Assembly has im-

portant functions. It has the right to consider and make recommendations concerning (1) the general principles of cooperation in the maintenance of peace and security, including the principles governing disarmament, and (2) any questions relating to the maintenance of peace and security brought before it by any members of the Organization or by the Security Council. Cases requiring enforcement action must be referred to the Security Council.

In addition to this assisting role in security matters, which carries great potential power, the General Assembly has exclusive authority, with the assistance of the Economic and Social Council, in the field of international cooperation in the solution of international economic, social, and other humanitarian problems, including the promotion of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, and in budgetary matters. It is charged with adjusting situations likely to impair the general welfare, which gives it primary responsibility for what is usually referred to as "peaceful change". It has important electoral functions. Its power to receive and consider reports from the Security Council and other bodies of the Organization has an importance which those accustomed to dealing with law and politics will readily perceive.

### IV

The purpose of the Organization "to maintain international peace and security" is to be achieved by two methods: (1) the taking of "effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace and the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace"; (2) the bringing about "by peaceful means [of] adjustment or settlement of international disputes which may lead to a breach of the peace". It is of the greatest importance to keep clearly in mind the close interrelation of these methods—that is, of procedures for settlement of disputes, both legal and political, and for use of force as a last reserve in the event that methods of pacific settlement have failed or will obviously be inadequate. This has nowhere been better stated than by Secretary Hull in his speech of September 12, 1943:

"We must . . . provide for differences of a political character, for those of a legal nature, and for cases where there is plain and unadulterated aggression.

"Political differences which present a threat to

the peace of the world should be submitted to agencies which would use the remedies of discussion, negotiation, conciliation, and good offices.

"Disputes of a legal character which present a threat to the peace of the world should be adjudicated by an international court of justice whose decisions would be based upon application of principles of law.

"But to assure peace there must also be means for restraining aggressors and nations that seek to resort to force for the accomplishment of purposes of their own. The peacefully inclined nations must, in the interest of general peace and security, be willing to accept responsibility for this task in accordance with their respective capacities."<sup>1</sup>

The procedure of pacific settlement recommended by the proposals rests upon the principle that "All members of the Organization shall settle their disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security are not endangered". This is far reaching in its consequences, especially when considered alongside the correlative principle that all members "shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force in any manner inconsistent with the purposes of the Organization". Members are not required to *settle* all disputes, but if they do undertake to settle a dispute it must be in a way which will not endanger peace and security, and they cannot in any case resort to force to bring about a settlement.

The procedure of pacific settlement provided in chapter VIII of the proposals can only properly be understood in the light of these principles. The distinguishing feature of this procedure is the role of the Security Council. It would not itself be a primary agency for the settlement of disputes. Its function would be to encourage settlement by the parties through peaceful means of their own choice; to recommend procedures and methods of settlement when the parties have failed to reach a settlement; and to keep constant vigil that failure to settle a dispute does not threaten the peace. If the Council should find that such a threat had resulted from failure to settle, it would have authority to "take any measures necessary for the maintenance of international peace and security in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Organization".

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of Sept. 18, 1943, p. 177.

This means that under the Organization no condition or action which threatens the peace would be allowed to continue. The purpose of the Organization would be to assure a peaceful society within which law and justice could develop and differences could be settled in an orderly and peaceful manner.

Reliance for the settlement of disputes would be placed upon the procedures of negotiation, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, and adjudication. The parties would be obligated first to seek a settlement by these means of any dispute endangering the maintenance of international peace and security. Any state, whether a member of the Organization or not, or the Secretary General could bring such a dispute to the attention either of the General Assembly or the Security Council. The General Assembly could discuss such disputes and make recommendations except where action by the Council is found to be necessary. The Council's function at this stage would be one of recommendation of methods of settlement and not of fixing and imposing the terms of a settlement. There would also be the possibility of resort by the parties to regional procedures of settlement, and the Council would be required to encourage settlement of local disputes through regional arrangements or agencies. If the parties failed to effect a settlement by these methods they would be obligated to refer the dispute to the Security Council.

Thus, we would have a very flexible procedure of adjustment and settlement, subject to the inflexible rule that a dispute should not under any circumstances be permitted to threaten the peace.

One additional important feature is the power of the Council to investigate any dispute or any situation which might lead to international friction or give rise to a dispute, for the purpose of determining whether its continuance is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. This would enable the Council to meet its responsibility for seeing that disputes which might threaten the peace are dealt with at an early stage.

## V

The international court of justice fits into this picture as the organ through which the parties to a dispute may seek judicial settlement. The proposals recommend that justiciable disputes should normally be referred to the international court of



justice. The word *normally* is introduced here to indicate that a particular dispute, even though justiciable, might be dealt with better in the interests of peace by some other means. Also, it would of course be open to the parties to agree to refer a dispute to some other tribunal.

The distinctive feature of the international court of justice provided for in the proposals is that it is conceived as an integral organ and instrumentality of the Organization rather than as a separate and unrelated or loosely related body. Its statute would be annexed to and be a part of the charter of the Organization. In contrast, the wholly separate character of the Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice has always been stressed. Further, all members of the Organization would *ipso facto* be parties to the statute, and states not members could only become parties under conditions fixed in each case by the General Assembly upon recommendation by the Security Council. All this has the advantage of identifying the court with the Organization's procedure of pacific settlement and of bringing its business within the orbit of the Organization's enforcement procedures. The decisions of the court would presumably not be enforced as such, but they would have behind them the powerful pressure generated by the whole procedure of collective action and they would be reenforced by the prospect of action to prevent any failure to abide by a decision resulting in a threat to the peace.

The question of ancillary or subsidiary chambers or courts is left open in the proposals. May I call your attention, however, to the provision that the international court of justice should constitute the principal judicial organ of the Organization. I will not attempt to embroider that proposition except to remark that, in the minds of lawyers, where there is a principal there must be an agent. So here presumably the possibility is not excluded of there being at some time ancillary or subsidiary chambers or courts.

The question is also left open in the proposals whether the statute of the court should be that of the existing Permanent Court of International Justice continued in force with such modifications as may be desirable, or a new statute based upon that of the Permanent Court. Whichever form the statute takes, there is the very difficult question of the procedure to be followed in bringing it into

operation. Expressions of views on both these matters would be welcomed by the Department of State. One such expression in favor of continuation of the present Statute, with adaptations, was communicated to the Secretary of State on November 8 by a distinguished group of international lawyers, including several of those present here this evening. Moreover, as the statute of the court is yet to be negotiated, you have an opportunity to offer any suggestions you may have as to important features of it. It is an opportunity which I should think lawyers interested in international organization and especially in international judicial organization would embrace with pleasure.

## VI

Formulating an amendment procedure for an international organization is always a matter of great difficulty. The difficulty was multiplied in the case of these proposals by the paramount importance of the Organization and the character of the obligations to be undertaken by members. Departure from the rule of unanimity was considered essential if the constitution of the Organization was to be a vital, growing instrument. But any departure had to take account of the legitimate needs and the natural sensibilities of the sovereign states thereby affected.

The Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice offers an immediate illustration of the serious problems resulting from failure to provide a method of amendment. In the absence of such a provision, normal practice and procedure would require the consent of all parties to any change in the statute.

In two or three recent cases—notably the constitutions of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration and of the Food and Agriculture Organization—amendments have been divided into classes. Those involving no new obligations would become effective by approval of the competent organs of the Organization, without reference to the states for approval. Others would be referred for ratification. Such a procedure did not seem practicable in an organization of the character projected in these proposals.

While departing from unanimity, the procedure offered in the proposals offers two safeguards. In the first place, the proposal of an amendment re-

quires a two-thirds vote of the General Assembly, which would mean that no amendment could be submitted for ratification without very broad support. In the second place, ratifications must include all the permanent members of the Security Council and a majority of the other members of the Organization. This provision concerning the permanent members is based upon the special responsibilities which they would assume, under the charter, for the enforcement of peace and security. These provisions represent an improvement over the Covenant of the League, which required ratification by all members of the Council and permitted states not ratifying to withdraw.

## VII

What I have said tonight shows clearly the double task which remains to be done. One is carrying to the people everywhere a clear understanding of the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. The other is a completion and clarification of the proposals to assure the effectiveness of the Organization to be fashioned from them.

The first task is a responsibility for all of us. There cannot be any doubt on the record that the people of this country want an international organization and that they want this country to take its full share of responsibility for making the organization a vital and powerful force in the international community. That conviction must be reenforced and translated into the irresistible force of an informed public opinion. Only on such an opinion can we rest our hopes for achieving the establishment of an organization to give us peace and security, and only the unflagging efforts of all of us can bring it about.

The second task is one in which the responsibility for direct action rests with the competent officials of this and of other governments. But that duty can most effectively be discharged with the alert and informed assistance of groups such as this. The Government welcomes your expert counsel. The people must look to you to help give form and substance to their demand for a new international political order that will assure them lasting peace. Your training and experience carries with it a heavy responsibility to help assure that the charter of the International Organization as finally adopted furnishes an effective answer to that demand.

## MEETING OF REPRESENTATIVES OF THE AMERICAN PEACE SOCIETY AND GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS

[Released to the press December 13]

On December 13, 1944, the American Peace Society met with the Secretary of State and with other officials of the Department of State in an informal exchange of views on the Dumbarton Oaks proposals. Harvard University made Dumbarton Oaks available for the meeting. Philip Marshall Brown, President of the American Peace Society, presided.

The Secretary of State was accompanied by the following officers of the Department: Green H. Hackworth, James Clement Dunn, Leo Pasvolosky, and G. Hayden Raynor.

Vice Admiral Russell Willson and Major General Muir S. Fairchild also participated in the discussion.

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**ADDRESS BY MR. GREW**—Continued from page 747 oratory, precisely as the Rockefeller Foundation and other similar bodies are constantly conducting their research for the elimination of cancer today. . . . Their findings, their warnings, their recommendations must be made in time for the prophylactic measures to be effective.

"We have come a long way since the First Hague Peace Conference of 1899; we still have a long way to go. But need we be discouraged? This movement toward international cooperation did not spring, like Athena from the brow of Zeus, full-grown from birth; it must develop gradually, profiting like any infant from its lessons and experience. It *will* grow to full maturity. . . ."

I ask you, ladies and gentlemen, to consider whether the proposed General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council, the Security Council, which is to sit constantly, fortified by the court of international justice and the Military Staff Committee, do not provide a sort of Faculty of International Political, Economic, and Social Health that will be potent to arrest international disease in its incipency and thus work toward the goal of averting for all future time the awful catastrophe of another world war.

# Agreements Relating to Air-Transport Services

[Released to the press December 16]

Agreements providing for commercial air-transport services between the United States and Denmark and Sweden were concluded by an exchange of notes dated December 16, 1944. These agreements result from discussions between representatives of the respective countries at the recent International Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago, and incorporate the standard clauses adopted at the Conference for use in bilateral agreements relating to scheduled air services.

The following is the text of the note addressed to the Swedish Minister, the Honorable W. Boström, quoting the agreement with Sweden and the accompanying annex:

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to negotiations which have recently taken place at the International Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago between the Swedish delegation headed by the Honorable Ragnar Kumlin and representatives of the Government of the United States of America, for the conclusion of a reciprocal air transport agreement.

It is my understanding that these negotiations, now terminated, have resulted in the following agreement:

## AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND SWEDEN RELATING TO AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES

The Governments of the United States of America and Sweden signed on September 8 and 9, 1933, an air navigation arrangement relating to the operation of civil aircraft of the one country in the territory of the other country, in which each party agreed that consent for the operations over its territory by air transport companies of the other party might not be refused on unreasonable or arbitrary grounds. Pursuant to the aforementioned arrangement of 1933, the two Governments hereby conclude the following supplementary arrangement covering the operation of scheduled airline services:

### Article 1

The contracting parties grant the rights specified in the Annex hereto necessary for establish-

ing the international civil air routes and services therein described, whether such services be inaugurated immediately or at a later date at the option of the contracting party to whom the rights are granted.

### Article 2

(a) Each of the air services so described shall be placed in operation as soon as the contracting party to whom the rights have been granted by Article 1 to designate an airline or airlines for the route concerned has authorized an airline for such route, and the contracting party granting the rights shall, subject to Article 6 hereof, be bound to give the appropriate operating permission to the airline or airlines concerned; provided that the airline so designated may be required to qualify before the competent aeronautical authorities of the contracting party granting the rights under the laws and regulations normally applied by these authorities before being permitted to engage in the operations contemplated by this agreement; and provided that in areas of hostilities or of military occupation, or in areas affected thereby, such inauguration shall be subject to the approval of the competent military authorities.

(b) It is understood that either contracting party granted commercial rights under this agreement should exercise them at the earliest practicable date except in the case of temporary inability to do so.

### Article 3

In order to prevent discriminatory practices and to assure equality of treatment, both contracting parties agree that:

(a) Each of the contracting parties may impose or permit to be imposed just and reasonable charges for the use of public airports and other facilities under its control. Each of the contracting parties agrees, however, that these charges shall not be higher than would be paid for the use of such airports and facilities by its national aircraft engaged in similar international services.

(b) Fuel, lubricating oils and spare parts introduced into the territory of one contracting party by the other contracting party or its na-



tionals, and intended solely for use by aircraft of such other contracting party shall be accorded national and most-favored-nation treatment with respect to the imposition of customs duties, inspection fees or other national duties or charges by the contracting party whose territory is entered.

(c) The fuel, lubricating oils, spare parts, regular equipment and aircraft stores retained on board civil aircraft of the airlines of one contracting party authorized to operate the routes and services described in the Annex shall, upon arriving in or leaving the territory of the other contracting party, be exempt from customs, inspection fees or similar duties or charges, even though such supplies be used or consumed by such aircraft on flights in that territory.

#### *Article 4*

Certificates of airworthiness, certificates of competency and licenses issued or rendered valid by one contracting party shall be recognized as valid by the other contracting party for the purpose of operating the routes and services described in the Annex. Each contracting party reserves the right, however, to refuse to recognize, for the purpose of flight above its own territory, certificates of competency and licenses granted to its own nationals by another State.

#### *Article 5*

(a) The laws and regulations of one contracting party relating to the admission to or departure from its territory of aircraft engaged in international air navigation, or to the operation and navigation of such aircraft while within its territory, shall be applied to the aircraft of the other contracting party without distinction as to nationality, and shall be complied with by such aircraft upon entering or departing from or while within the territory of the first party.

(b) The laws and regulations of one contracting party as to the admission to or departure from its territory of passengers, crew, or cargo of aircraft, such as regulations relating to entry, clearance, immigration, passports, customs, and quarantine shall be complied with by or on behalf of such passengers, crew or cargo of the other contracting party upon entrance into or departure from, or while within the territory of the first party.

#### *Article 6*

Each contracting party reserves the right to withhold or revoke a certificate or permit to an airline of the other party in any case where it is not satisfied that substantial ownership and effective control are vested in nationals of a party to this agreement, or in case of failure of an airline to comply with the laws of the State over which it operates as described in Article 5 hereof, or to perform its obligations under this agreement.

#### *Article 7*

This agreement and all contracts connected therewith shall be registered with the Provisional International Civil Aviation Organization.

#### *Article 8*

Either contracting party may terminate the rights for services granted by it under this agreement by giving one year's notice to the other contracting party.

#### *Article 9*

Except as may be modified by the present agreement, the general principles of the aforementioned air navigation arrangement of 1933 as applicable to scheduled air transport services shall continue in force until otherwise agreed upon by the two contracting parties.

#### *Article 10*

In the event either of the contracting parties considers it desirable to modify the routes or conditions set forth in the attached Annex, it may request consultation between the competent authorities of both contracting parties, such consultation to begin within a period of sixty days from the date of the request. When these authorities mutually agree on new or revised conditions affecting the Annex, their recommendations on the matter will come into effect after they have been confirmed by an exchange of diplomatic notes.

#### ANNEX TO AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND SWEDEN

A. Airlines of the United States authorized under the present agreement are accorded rights of

transit and non-traffic stop in Swedish territory, as well as the right to pick up and discharge international traffic in passengers, cargo and mail at Stockholm, on the following route:

New York or Chicago, via intermediate points, to Stockholm; in both directions.

B. Airlines of Sweden authorized under the present agreement are accorded rights of transit and non-traffic stop in the territory of the United States, as well as the right to pick up and discharge international traffic in passengers, cargo and mail at New York or Chicago, on the following route:

Stockholm, via intermediate points, to New York or Chicago; in both directions.

You will, of course, understand that this agreement may be affected by subsequent legislation enacted by the Congress of the United States.

I shall be glad to have you inform me whether it is the understanding of your Government that the terms of the agreement resulting from the negotiations are as above set forth. If so, it is suggested that January 1, 1945 become the effective date. If your Government concurs in this suggestion the Government of the United States will regard it as becoming effective at such time.

Accept [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:

STOKELEY W. MORGAN

The Honorable W. BOSTROM,

*Minister of Sweden.*

The above note was acknowledged by the Swedish Minister, who confirmed that the terms of the agreement were acceptable to his Government.

The following is the text of the note addressed to the Danish Minister, the Honorable Henrik de Kauffmann, quoting the agreement with Denmark and the accompanying annex:

DECEMBER 16, 1944

SIR:

I have the honor to refer to discussions which have recently taken place at the International Civil Aviation Conference in Chicago between you and representatives of the Government of the United States of America, for the conclusion of a reciprocal air transport agreement.

It is my understanding that these discussions, now terminated, have resulted in the following agreement:

# AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND DENMARK RELATING TO AIR TRANSPORT SERVICES

The Governments of the United States of America and Denmark signed on March 12 and 24, 1934, an air navigation arrangement relating to the operation of civil aircraft of the one country in the territory of the other country, in which each party agreed that consent for the operations over its territory by air transport companies of the other party might not be refused on unreasonable or arbitrary grounds. Pursuant to the aforementioned arrangement of 1934, the Government of the United States of America and the Danish Minister in Washington on behalf of Denmark hereby conclude the following supplementary arrangement covering the operation of scheduled airline services:

[Here follow Articles 1 through 8, the texts of which are identic with the corresponding Articles in the agreement between the United States and Sweden as printed above.]

## Article 9

Except as may be modified by the present agreement, the general principles of the aforementioned air navigation arrangement of 1934, as applicable to scheduled air transport services, shall continue in force until otherwise agreed upon by the two contracting parties.

[Here follows Article 10, the text of which is identic with Article 10 in the agreement between the United States and Denmark as printed above.]

# ANNEX TO AIR TRANSPORT AGREEMENT BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA AND DENMARK

A. Airlines of the United States authorized under the present agreement are accorded rights of transit and non-traffic stop in Danish territory, including Greenland, as well as the right to pick up and discharge international traffic in passengers, cargo and mail at Copenhagen, on the following route:

The United States to Denmark and points beyond, via intermediate points; in both directions.

B. Airlines of Denmark authorized under the present agreement are accorded rights of transit and non-traffic stop in the territory of the United States, as well as the right to pick up and discharge international traffic in passengers, cargo

and mail at New York or Chicago, on the following route:

Denmark to the United States, via intermediate points; in both directions.

You will, of course, understand that this agreement may be affected by subsequent legislation enacted by the Congress of the United States.

I shall be glad to have you inform me whether it is your understanding that the terms of the agreement resulting from the discussions are as above set forth. If so, it is suggested that the agreement enter into force provisionally on January 1, 1945 and definitively upon confirmation by a free Danish Government when such a Government shall have been established following the liberation of Denmark. If you concur in this suggestion the Government of the United States will regard the proposal as becoming effective under these terms.

Accept [etc.]

For the Secretary of State:

STOKELEY W. MORGAN

The Honorable HENRIK DE KAUFFMANN,  
*Minister of Denmark.*

The above note was acknowledged by the Danish Minister, who confirmed that the terms of the agreement were acceptable.

## Present Problems in Italy

[Released to the press December 14]

The American and British Ambassadors in Rome have been in close contact during the recent developments in Italy. The American Ambassador, Alexander C. Kirk, has kept the Department of State carefully informed. He reports that the new Government of Italy is supported by a majority of the political parties, comprising the Committee of National Liberation, and thus maintains a representative character.

The United States Government, in accord with the British Government, is happy to see the new Italian Government under Signor Bonomi take office.

## Issuance of Visas in Italy And France

[Released to the press December 12]

American diplomatic and consular officers in France are being authorized to give consideration to the following categories of visa applicants. American diplomatic and consular officers in Italy beginning January 1, 1945 also are being authorized to give consideration to the following categories of visa applicants. The travel of those applicants, of course, will be subject to wartime restriction of transportation.

(1) Diplomatic and official visas.

(2) Non-immigrant visas of persons coming to the United States to engage in activities in furtherance of the war effort.

(3) Non-immigrant Italian and French nationals proceeding to the United States for the purpose of promoting future trade relations between Italy and the United States, and France and the United States, when permitted by wartime conditions.

(4) The wives of American citizens, husbands of American citizens married prior to July 1, 1932, and minor children of American citizens; all of whom are entitled to non-quota status and who are the beneficiaries of approved petitions.

Visas will not be issued before the applicants are in possession of passports issued by the country to which they owe allegiance and are in possession of exit permits from their country of residence.

Diplomatic visas will be issued by the American Embassy at Rome. The Consulate at Rome will issue visas to officials not entitled to diplomatic status and other non-immigrant visas mentioned in categories (2) and (3). The consular officers at Naples and Palermo will issue official visas and non-immigrant visas mentioned in categories (2) and (3) and will in addition issue the non-quota visas mentioned in category (4).

Visas of all categories mentioned will be issued at the American Embassy and Consulate General at Paris. Visas other than diplomatic will be issued by the American Consulate General at Marseille.

Visas in other categories will be authorized at a later date when travel and other facilities are available.



## Third Anniversary of the Outbreak of War in the Pacific

### EXCHANGE OF MESSAGES BETWEEN GENERALISSIMO CHIANG KAI-SHEK AND THE PRESIDENT

[Released to the press December 16]

The message dated December 7, 1944 from His Excellency Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, President of the National Government of the Republic of China, to President Roosevelt follows:

On the third anniversary of the outbreak of the Pacific war, I take great pleasure in extending to you and the American people my warm greetings and best wishes as well as that of the Chinese people.

The glorious achievements of your armed forces in the Pacific theatre are not only a source of just pride for the United States, but have won the deepest admiration of all her allies. We are proud to be your comrades-in-arms in this war against the evil forces of aggression and are fully confident that as a result of the increasingly close cooperation between our two countries, we shall soon be able to inflict a crushing defeat on the enemy despite his present desperate struggle on the Asiatic mainland.

CHIANG KAI-SHEK

The reply made by President Roosevelt to the message from Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek follows:

DECEMBER 13, 1944

I thank you in the name of the American people for your stirring message on the anniversary of the outbreak of war in the Pacific.

The satisfaction which we take in the achievements of our armed forces is accompanied by a solemn realization that such achievements are an integral part of a great coordinated effort wherein each success on the part of one nation is built and in large measure depends upon the splendid contributions of all the United Nations. We are proud to be fighting beside the Chinese people, whose long, unconquerable resistance to aggres-

sion forms a foundation stone of the democratic cause, and who, we are confident, will worthily share in the approaching phase of final victory.

FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT

## United States Representative On United Nations Interim Commission on Food and Agriculture

[Released to the press December 11]

The President has approved the designation of Howard R. Tolley, Chief, Bureau of Agricultural Economics, Department of Agriculture, as this Government's representative on the Interim Commission to take the place left vacant by the recent resignation of Paul H. Appelby.<sup>1</sup>

The President has also approved the designation of Leroy D. Stinebower, Adviser, Office of Economic Affairs, Department of State, as the alternate representative of the Government of the United States on the Interim Commission.

## Suspension of Tonnage Duties Respecting Ecuador

President Roosevelt, by statute authority vested in him, issued proclamation 2632 on December 12, 1944 declaring and proclaiming that "the foreign discriminating duties of tonnage and imposts within the United States are suspended and discontinued so far as respects the vessels of Ecuador and the produce, manufactures, or merchandise imported in said vessels into the United States from Ecuador or from any other foreign country; the suspension to take effect from November 1, 1944, and to continue so long as the reciprocal exemption of vessels belonging to citizens of the United States and their cargoes shall be continued, and no longer." The full text of the proclamation appears in the *Federal Register* for December 16, 1944, page 14665.

<sup>1</sup> BULLETIN of July 17, 1943, p. 33.

## Nomination for Under Secretary of State

STATEMENT BY JOSEPH C. GREW BEFORE THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE<sup>1</sup>

[Released to the press December 15]

MR. CHAIRMAN: First of all, I request the courtesy of the Committee in allowing me to set straight certain distortions of fact contained in an article from the *Philadelphia Record* of December 6 which was published in the *Congressional Record* on that date. In that article the statement occurs:

"Since Pearl Harbor and his return to the United States, Grew has frequently advocated a policy of doing business with Emperor Hirohito after the war. He says we must preserve the Mikado as a Japanese symbol around which a stable peaceful government can be built."

Permit me to say, Mr. Chairman, that never since my return to the United States after our six months of internment in Japan have I made such statements or advocated such a policy as are attributed to me in the article under reference. I should like to take this opportunity very briefly to set forth my precise attitude on this question, especially as the misquotation and distortion of one or two of more than 250 public speeches which I have made in our country, trying to tell our people something about what we are up against in fighting Japan, have been widely published and have conveyed an entirely erroneous impression of my position.

My position, in a nutshell, is this: When we get to Tokyo—and we certainly will get there in due course—our main objective will be to render it impossible for Japan again to threaten world peace. We shall first have to maintain order, primarily to provide our army of occupation with conditions which will facilitate their task and safeguard the lives of its personnel and secondarily to conduce toward the attaining of our main objective. We shall then have to take specific measures to demilitarize Japan, both physically and intellectually. This will obviously include, among other things, the destruction of the Japanese military machine and the destruction of their tools of war and the paraphernalia for making those tools of war in the future.

The accomplishment of these objectives in the

post-surrender period in the shortest practicable space of time will be a matter of first importance. The American people will not only expect but will demand a high degree of perfection in our planning, so that the achievement of our security aims as they relate to Japan and, therefore, the repatriation of our soldiers in the army of occupation will not be unnecessarily prolonged. But many still imponderable factors inevitably enter into that planning. Japan has never lost a war in modern times. We therefore have no yardstick to measure the eventual impact on the Japanese mind of the cataclysm of destruction and defeat. Before we allow any Japanese authority to emerge in the post-surrender period, we can—and I hope we will—require it to demonstrate that it will be cooperative, stable, and trustworthy. But if we were to prescribe in advance the eventual Japanese political structure that will follow military occupation, thus severely circumscribing the compass within which such structure could take shape, we would necessarily have to assume the responsibility for any delay in achieving our security objectives and in bringing home our soldiers. We shall have to be governed by facts and realities rather than by theories when the time comes to act, and in taking measures for the attainment of our objectives, we shall wish to avail ourselves of whatever may appear to be assets and to eliminate, as far as practicable, whatever may prove to be liabilities. This seems to me to be plain common sense.

Now with regard to the institution of the emperor, I do not think that anyone is yet in a position to determine definitely whether it is going to be an asset or a liability. Whatever decisions are made they should certainly be made on a purely realistic basis and on the basis of intimate contact with the various current factors involved in the problem. It must be remembered today, if we are not to repeat the errors of the past, that Japanese attitudes and reactions have not conformed in a single important respect to any universal pattern or standard of behavior. We shall have learned nothing from the past if we assume that Japanese reaction in any specific instance is going to con-

<sup>1</sup> Made before the committee on Dec. 12, 1944.

form to a universal pattern. I have never held and have never stated that the Japanese Emperor should be retained after the war nor have I ever held or stated that the Japanese Emperor should be eliminated after the war. I believe that the problem should be left fluid until we get to Tokyo and our authorities and the authorities of those of the United Nations directly concerned can size up the situation and can determine what will best conduce to the attainment of our objectives. I do not believe that the solution of this problem can intelligently or helpfully be reached until we get to Tokyo.

I have a feeling that the importance of the emperor institution, especially as a factor in the dynamic aspects of Japanese policies and actions, has been greatly exaggerated. It is argued that it is the existence of this institution that made possible Japanese militarism and aggression. This argument must be examined in the light of the fact that during the preceding period of Japanese aggression in the sixteenth century, when the ruling warlord tried to conquer Korea and China, the imperial family had been barely maintaining a shadow existence for several centuries. Unlike the warlords of today whose conquests, they proclaim, are due to the "august virtues of the Emperor", whose instruments they proclaim themselves to be, it was Hideyoshi, the shogun or military dictator, and not the Emperor, who said that when he had conquered China and Korea he would make himself and not the Emperor the master of the world. The emperors in those days were completely overshadowed by the shoguns and were usually hard put to it to maintain a bare living. My point is, therefore, that the Japanese do not need to have an emperor to be militaristic and aggressive, nor is it the existence of an emperor that makes them militaristic and aggressive. There are conditions more deeply rooted in their social structure and concepts growing out of that social structure which will have to be excised in one way or another. It will be one of our fundamental objectives to remove those conditions. As I have said, no one today can predict what the impact of the cataclysm of defeat will have on the Japanese mind. There might be a complete revolution from all the archaic concepts of the past. The emperor institution might, on the other hand, be the only political element capable of exercising a stabilizing influence. To understand the position of the Emperor in the Japanese political

### Statements Before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

The statements before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations made by the Secretary of State, Joseph C. Grew, William L. Clayton, James C. Dunn, Archibald MacLeish, and Nelson A. Rockefeller on December 12 were printed in the BULLETIN of December 10, 1944, pages 686-93.

structure, it might be useful to draw a homely parallel.

As you know, the queen bee in a hive is surrounded by the attentions of the hive, which treats her with veneration and ministers in every way to her comfort. The time comes, however, when a decision of vital importance to the hive must be made. The hive vibrates as though in excited debate, and finally the moment arrives when the queen is thrust forth into the outside world, and the hive follows her to its new home. It was not the queen which made the decision; yet, if one were to remove the queen from the swarm the hive would disintegrate.

I do not wish to push the parallel too far, but I believe it describes with substantial accuracy the position in the past of the imperial institution. If a new condition has arisen, so much the better, but if the other possibility eventuates and the emperor remains as the sole stabilizing force, I would not wish to have ourselves committed to a course which might conceivably fix on us the burden of maintaining and controlling for an indefinite period a disintegrating community of over seventy million people.

That, Mr. Chairman, represents in brief my position on this subject. That is why I have never advocated either the retention or the elimination of the Japanese Emperor after the war. I want to wait and see. I believe this to be plain common sense.

It may be pertinent to add in this connection the statement of Chiang Kai-shek in his New Year's message to the Chinese armies and people on January 1, 1944 that in his opinion the question of what form of government Japan should adopt after the war should be left to the awakened and repentant Japanese people to decide for themselves.



# Japan's Mandated Islands

By GEORGE H. BLAKESLEE<sup>1</sup>

The chief value of the Japanese mandated islands is strategic. They have been called anchored airplane carriers which largely control the Pacific Ocean between Hawaii and the Philippines. In view of Japan's use of them in the present war, the question of their future sovereignty or control will presumably be raised in the negotiation of the peace.

## PHYSICAL GEOGRAPHY

The South Sea Islands under Japanese mandate, comprising the Marshall, Marianas, and Caroline groups, extend about 2,700 miles from east to west and about 1,300 miles from north to south. They number 623 islands and small island groups, many of which are surrounded by a large encircling coral reef. Their total land area is small, amounting to about 830 square miles, or considerably less than the area of the State of Rhode Island. The Marshalls, to the east, are low-lying coral islands. The Marianas, to the north, are high, of volcanic origin, ranging from 1,000 to 3,000 feet in elevation. The Carolines, extending farthest to the west, are in large part atolls, coral islets surrounded by reefs, although the larger islands have high volcanic peaks in the center. The Island of Guam, owned by the United States, is one of the Marianas group. The climate of the islands is hot and humid.

The islands have a number of landing fields, a number of small, well-protected harbors suitable for submarines, seaplanes, and light surface naval vessels, and 10 fleet anchorages within certain of the lagoons. The Truk Island group is especially important. It contains 7 high and some 60 low islands, all enclosed within a great coral reef; and the lagoon thus formed is 30 miles in diameter. The mandated islands, which parallel and cut the natural line of communications between Hawaii and the Philippines, furnish bases for attacks on American island possessions.

<sup>1</sup> Mr. Blakeslee is Consultant to the Division and Head of the Far Eastern Unit, Division of Territorial Studies, Office of Special Political Affairs, Department of State.

## THE PEOPLE

The population in 1920, the year of the first Japanese census, and in 1938, the year covered by the last Japanese report on the mandate, was:

	1920	1938
Natives	48,505	50,868
Japanese	3,671	70,141
Foreigners	46	119
Total	52,222	121,128

According to the census of 1940, summaries of which are available, the total population was 131,157. Since the native stock increases slowly, it may be estimated that in 1940 about 80,000 Japanese and 51,000 natives lived in the islands. The Japanese immigrants now greatly outnumber the natives; this is especially noticeable in the Marianas, where 44,991 Japanese and only 4,192 natives lived in 1938. The Japanese population has been growing rapidly from immigration and through natural increase.

The natives are divided between Chamorros, who number only 3,827, and Kanakas. The former, who live for the most part in the Marianas, are physically somewhat similar to the Filipinos. They have been affected considerably by intermarriage with the Spanish. They speak a form of Spanish and have adopted a large measure of Spanish civilization. The Kanakas are Micronesian, with a mixture of Melanesian, Malay, and Polynesian; they speak a variety of native dialects. In the Marshalls and in some of the eastern Carolines they were civilized and largely Christianized by missionaries from the United States; in the western Carolines, especially Yap, their primitive native life has been little affected.

## RESOURCES

The economic value of the mandate probably is not great. Coconut palms are found on most of the islands. Phosphate rock in good quantity is mined on Angaur and neighboring islands in the western Carolines. Sugar is raised on Saipan, Tinian, and Rota, of the Marianas. Bonito, a variety of fish, is dried and exported. Recently

substantial quantities of bauxite and manganese are alleged to have been discovered. The Japanese have estimated the bauxite deposits, principally on Palau, at 4,000,000 metric tons. In the spring of 1943 the Tokyo radio stated that "a vein of high-grade manganese ore, with a metallic content of 80 to 90 percent was discovered on Saipan a few days ago. Last spring another vein of manganese ore was struck in Omiya island, formerly Guam, immediately after Japanese occupation and substantial quantities are now being mined." If these reports regarding bauxite and manganese ore should be substantiated, the economic value of the islands would be substantially greater than previously estimated.

### HISTORY

#### To 1919

The Spanish early obtained title to the Marianas and Carolines and in the former group introduced the elements of Spanish civilization. Germany took possession of the Marshalls in 1885; and in 1899, after Guam in the Marianas had been ceded to the United States as a result of the Spanish-American War, it bought from Spain for a little over \$4,000,000 the remaining Marianas and all the Carolines. Germany thus owned, from 1899 to 1914, all the islands which now compose the Japanese mandate.

The German administration was reasonably successful both economically and in its treatment of the natives, who were left very largely to their own tribal customs and tribal political control. The Germans greatly increased the export of copra and of phosphate rock.

In 1914 the Japanese captured all these German islands except the phosphate Island of Nauru, south of the equator, one of the British-occupied Marshalls. The Germans had neither fortifications nor soldiers on any of the islands.

In 1919, at the time of the Paris Peace Conference, Japan was in firm military occupation of these islands and had formal promises, obtained in 1917, from the Governments of Great Britain, France, and Italy that at the peace conference to follow the war those Governments would support Japan's claim to the German islands north of the equator.

#### United States Interests to 1919

*Missions from the United States.* United States missionary influence became so strong throughout the Marshalls and the eastern Carolines that the

claims of the missions alone would probably have been ample to justify the United States in extending its political control over all the archipelagoes in this part of the Pacific. In 1852 the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Missions, with headquarters in Boston, which was in reality the missionary society of the Congregational Church, established missions at Kusaie and Ponape, two of the principal islands of the eastern Carolines, and in 1857 on the Marshalls. These islands were entirely independent. The missionaries civilized and educated the natives; and after some years they converted to Christianity most of those living on certain of the eastern Carolines and on the Marshalls. In some of the islands the missionaries were practically the rulers. The natives came to favor Americans and to prefer the sovereignty of the United States to that of any other foreign power.

*The Scramble, 1884-5.* The United States made no move to develop its predominant influence into political control. It complained vigorously when Germany seized the Marshalls in 1885 and when Spain reasserted its old claims to the Carolines; yet the United States made no adequate effort to preserve their independence, and it failed to take them itself.

*United States Change of Policy, 1898.* The policy of the United States, which in the 1880's was opposed to the acquisition of any of the Pacific islands, was changed by the Spanish War. During the negotiations at Paris in 1898 between the United States and Spanish Commissions, the United States Delegates became convinced of the importance to the United States of securing not only Guam but also the Caroline Islands, provided it acquired the Philippines.<sup>1</sup> The United States Commission, by authority of the United States Government, offered Spain an additional \$1,000,000 for the Island of Kusaie, one of the most important of the eastern Carolines, together with the right to land telegraph cables in certain other Spanish territory. The Spanish Commission refused the offer, and the United States Government was evidently unwilling to insist upon the cession of Kusaie by a threat of renewing the war; the matter, therefore, was dropped.

*Strategic Value to the United States.* It was largely because of their naval importance that

<sup>1</sup> Treaty of Peace, 1898, *Foreign Relations*, 1898, pp. 831-40.

Germany had purchased the Carolines and Marianas in 1899. Japanese naval and nationalist leaders wished to keep the Islands chiefly because of their possible value in a war against the United States. They frequently expressed this view in speeches and in newspaper and magazine articles.

*The Paris Peace Conference, 1919-20*

At the Paris conference the Japanese Delegation claimed that the former German islands north of the equator should be transferred to Japan in full sovereignty. President Wilson made no effort to obtain them for this country, although he was disturbed at the thought of Japan's possessing them and was opposed to permitting Japan to use them as naval bases. It was finally decided that these islands should be constituted as a "C" mandate under the administration of Japan but subject to the terms of a charter or mandate and to the supervision of the League of Nations.

Important legal provisions and steps were involved, as follows:

By article 119<sup>1</sup> of the Treaty of Versailles Germany renounced in favor of the Principal Allied and Associated Powers (the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, and the United States) "all her rights and titles over her oversea possessions."

By article 22<sup>2</sup> of the treaty it was provided that Germany's former colonies should be administered by Mandatories, according to certain general principles enunciated in the article, and "on behalf of the League."

Considering these two articles together, it appears that the Principal Allied and Associated Powers had obtained Germany's "rights and titles" to her islands in the Pacific north of the equator but that they could exercise these rights and titles in only one way: by allocating these islands as a mandate to be administered by some mandatory power.

The Principal Allied and Associated Powers, including the United States, through their representatives, at a meeting on May 7, 1919 voted to confer on Japan a mandate for the "German islands north of the Equator". This was a preliminary and conditional commitment, since the

Treaty of Versailles had not been signed and the Principal Allied and Associated Powers were not at the moment in possession of Germany's "rights and titles". Later, after the treaty had been signed and the United States had refused to ratify it, the Principal Allied Powers, without the consent of the Associated Power (the United States), acting on the basis of the vote of May 7, allocated these German islands as a mandate to Japan, and on December 17, 1920 the Council of the League of Nations approved and confirmed the mandate charter which prescribed the terms and conditions on which Japan should act as Mandatory.

Japan formally agreed to be Mandatory on the conditions stated in the mandate charter, which permitted her to "have full power of administration and legislation over the territory . . . as an integral portion of the Empire of Japan" but which placed her under the following legal obligations: (1) to "promote to the utmost the material and moral well-being and the social progress of the inhabitants of the territory";<sup>3</sup> in various ways which were specified; (2) to make an annual report to the Council of the League on its administration of the mandate; (3) to observe the following prohibition: "Furthermore, no military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the territory".

*The United States and the Mandate Controversy*

The United States Government raised two issues with the Council of the League and with Japan, based on two contentions, as follows: (1) that the Island of Yap had not been included within the Japanese mandate and (2) that the Council of the League had no authority to confirm the Japanese mandate and that the Japanese Government had no legal right to act as Mandatory without the express consent of the United States.

*Yap.* Yap was a cable center with cables running to Shanghai, to Guam, and to Menado in the Dutch possessions. President Wilson and Secretary Lansing wished to institute a special regime for Yap so that United States cable interests might use the island, and during discussions regarding the allocation of various mandates held by the Council of Principal Powers they made reservations regarding Yap, stating that it should not be included within the Japanese mandate. On

<sup>1</sup> Redmond, *Treaties, Conventions, International Acts, Protocols, and Agreements Between the United States of America and Other Powers, 1910-1923*, p. 3391.

<sup>2</sup> *Ibid.*, p. 3342.

<sup>3</sup> Treaty Series 664.



May 7, 1919, however, the Council of Principal Powers reached decisions regarding the allocation of various mandates; and the minutes stated without any qualification that Japan was to have the mandate over "the German islands north of the Equator". When in October 1920 it appeared that the Japanese mandate charter, which would evidently be approved shortly by the Council, contained no such reservation, the United States Government protested vigorously to Japan, Great Britain, France, Italy, and the Council of the League.

In 1921 the Japanese Government agreed to open negotiations on the issue.

*The Allocation of Mandates.* After the United States declined to ratify the Treaty of Versailles, a question arose over what rights and interests it possessed in and in regard to the mandated territories. Following an extended correspondence with the Council of the League and with the Governments of the Principal Powers, the United States Government defined its position most fully in an identic note of April 2, 1921,<sup>1</sup> written by Secretary of State Hughes, to the Governments of Japan, Great Britain, France, and Italy. Its contentions were in summary the following:

(1) The United States as a participant in the war obtained rights, in and with regard to the territories won as a result of the victory, of which it could not be deprived without its consent;

(2) These rights were confirmed by the Treaty of Versailles, which provided that Germany ceded its rights and titles over its overseas possessions to the Principal Allied and Associated Powers, of which the United States was admittedly one;

(3) They were further recognized by the wording of the mandates, which stated that it was the Principal Allied and Associated Powers which allocated the mandated territories and which thereby recognized that the allocation could not be effective without the agreement of the United States;

(4) They were strengthened (a contention advanced in later documents) by the treaty between the United States and Germany signed on August 25, 1921,<sup>2</sup> by which Germany confirmed to the United States the benefits which accrued to it under article 119 of the Treaty of Versailles;

(5) The United States, therefore, still retained its rights and interests in Japan's mandated islands (popularly termed an undivided one-fifth

ownership), and these could not be ceded or surrendered to Japan or to any other state except by treaty.

After extended correspondence Japan also consented to open negotiations in regard to the rights of the United States in its mandate.

*The Convention of February 11, 1922<sup>3</sup>*

After months of negotiation the United States and Japan agreed on a convention, signed February 11, 1922, which defined their respective rights in the Japanese mandate. Its significant provisions were as follows:

*Yap.* The Island of Yap was recognized by the United States as a part of the Japanese mandate; but the United States and its nationals were granted equality with Japan in the island in all that pertained to cable rights and privileges. Apparently no advantage was taken of this concession. Of the former three cables, the only one now in operation connects with Naku in the Liuchiu Islands and with the South Seas and Japan. Presumably the increased use of radio has lessened the former keen interest in cable rights.

*The Japanese Mandate.* (1) The United States consented to the administration by Japan of its mandated islands, subject to the provisions of the American-Japanese convention and pursuant to the mandate charter, the text of which was copied verbatim in the convention.

(2) Japan granted to the United States "all the benefits of the engagements of Japan, defined in Articles 3, 4, and 5 of the aforesaid Mandate", articles which included all the general rights enjoyed by the members of the League of Nations and which thus specifically gave to the United States a direct pledge from Japan that "no military or naval bases shall be established or fortifications erected in the territory".

(3) Existing treaties between the United States and Japan were to be applicable to the mandate.

(4) Japan promised to send to the United States a duplicate of its annual report to the Council of the League of Nations.

(5) "Nothing contained in the present Convention shall be affected by any modification which may be made in the terms of the Mandate as recited in the Convention, unless such modification

<sup>1</sup> *Foreign Relations*, 1921, vol. 2, pp. 279-83.

<sup>2</sup> 42 Stat. 1939.

<sup>3</sup> 42 Stat. 2149.

shall have been expressly assented to by the United States".

(6) In a note given to the Secretary of State at the time of the signature of the treaty, Baron Shidehara, the Japanese Ambassador, wrote: "I have the honor to assure you, under authorization of my Government, that the usual comity will be extended to nationals and vessels of the United States in visiting the harbors and waters of those islands".

(7) Since the convention extended to the mandate the existing treaties between the United States and Japan, United States citizens were legally entitled to enjoy in the mandated islands all the rights provided for in the American-Japanese commercial treaty of 1911,<sup>1</sup> including the right "to enter, travel and reside" in the islands in order "to carry on trade" and "generally to do anything incident to or necessary for trade upon the same terms as native citizens or subjects, submitting themselves to the laws and regulations there established" and "freely to come with their ships and cargoes to all places, ports and rivers in the territories of the other which are or may be opened to foreign commerce".

The treaty of 1911 was terminated on January 26, 1940.

#### *The Present Legal Status of the Islands*

The last report received from the Japanese Government on its administration of its mandated islands, for the year 1938, stated that "the Territory is under Japanese Mandate according to the provisions of Article 22 of the Treaty of Peace signed at Versailles on June 28, 1919 between the Allied and Associated Powers and Germany as well as to the decision made by the Council of the League of Nations on December 17, 1920".

After Japan gave notice, in 1933, of its withdrawal from the League of Nations, which became effective on March 27, 1935, there was considerable discussion of its right to be a Mandatory if it ceased to be a member of the League. Mr. Hirota, the Japanese Foreign Minister, said in the Diet on February 22, 1934: "The Japanese Government believe that Japan has acquired the status as Man-

datory through a decision reached among the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and that her status as Mandatory will not be affected in any way by Japan's withdrawal from the League. The Japanese Government, however, have never entertained the view that these islands are Japanese territory." Japan's right to continue to act as Mandatory was not officially questioned after its withdrawal from the League.

## The Proclaimed List

[Released to the press December 17]

The Secretary of State, acting in conjunction with the Acting Secretary of the Treasury, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Commerce, the Administrator of Foreign Economic Administration, and the Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs, issued on December 16 Cumulative Supplement 4 to Revision VIII of the Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals, promulgated September 13, 1944.

Cumulative Supplement 4 to Revision VIII supersedes Cumulative Supplement 3 dated November 17, 1944.

Part I of Cumulative Supplement 4 contains 23 additional listings in the other American republics and 279 deletions; Part II contains 19 additional listings outside the American republics and 45 deletions.

The names of a considerable number of persons and firms in Mexico have been deleted in the current supplement. These deletions are a consequence of the effective action taken by the Mexican Government under the Mexican Law Governing Enemy Properties of Businesses of June 11, 1942. Subsequent supplements are expected to continue the reduction of the Proclaimed List for Mexico. It is the previously announced policy of the United States Government to coordinate its Proclaimed List controls with the controls established by other governments. Similar deletions will be made as rapidly as the effectiveness of the local control laws in the various countries makes the continued inclusion of particular names in the Proclaimed List no longer necessary.

<sup>1</sup> 37 Stat. 1504.

# First Progress Report of the Joint Survey Group

By ALAN N. STEYNE<sup>1</sup>

The Joint Survey Group was established on April 25, 1944 to examine the reporting requirements of the Foreign Service, to initiate and prepare necessary instructions for the field, and to recommend any measures directly or indirectly needed to bring Foreign Service reporting to a maximum efficiency.

The Group is an interdepartmental organization, composed of over 100 Foreign Service officers and other officials who make use of the reports from the field and who prepare instructions requesting information from abroad. When desirable, individuals not originally members are co-opted for special assignments. All operate as members of one or more of the subcommittees or their subsidiary working parties which deal with specific aspects of the reporting problem.<sup>2</sup> The diagram below illustrates the break-down of the work of the Joint Survey Group into functional committees. (The arrows indicate flow of instructions; italics indicate committees and working parties whose assignments are completed and which will be disbanded.)

The proposals of the Group thus represent the consensus of the country and functional desk officers in the Department and other interested agencies. Suggestions from the field have also been solicited. Numerous helpful ideas have been received which have been or will be included in the Group's plans. This corporate backing has been effective in accelerating approval and action upon the recommendations.


Instructions and recommendations approved by the Program Committee, which reviews and coordinates the subcommittees' work, are transmitted to the Director of the Office of the Foreign Service. The Director puts the recommendations into effect or sponsors them before the appropriate departmental committees or officials for action.

The progress made by the Group during its first five months of work is as follows:

A. Twenty-six instructions have been prepared which relate to the following aspects of reporting:

1. General Survey of Foreign Service Reporting
2. Preparation of Quarterly Economic Reviews
3. Requirements Reporting
4. Reporting Duties of Mineral Attachés
5. Preparation of Mineral Trade Notes

TRANSMISSION OF RECOMMENDATIONS AND INSTRUCTIONS TO APPROPRIATE DEPARTMENTS, AGENCIES, AND MISSIONS



<sup>1</sup> Mr. Steyne, a Foreign Service officer, is chairman of the Steering Committee of the Joint Survey Group.

<sup>2</sup> BULLETIN of June 24, 1944, p. 589.



6. Preparation of Agricultural Reports.
7. Preparation of Non-Agricultural and Commodity Reports
8. Market Reports
9. Statistical Reporting
10. Preparation of Commerce Questionnaires
11. Preparation of the Annual Economic Review
12. Financial Reporting
13. Reporting in Liberated Areas
14. Evaluation and Grading of Reports, etc.
15. Civil Aviation Reporting
16. Economic and Political Conference Work of Foreign Service Officers
17. Cultural Reporting
18. Informational Reporting
19. Construction Reporting
20. Electric Power Reporting
21. Preparation of Summaries of Economic Information
22. Biographical Reporting
23. Political Reporting From Consular Posts
24. Commercial Policy Reporting
25. Labor Reporting
26. Telecommunications Reporting

The representatives from all the interested agencies have cooperated with officials from the interested divisions in the Department of State in helping the Group draft these reporting directives. Those particularly active are the Department of Commerce, the Department of Agriculture, the Tariff Commission, the Foreign Economic Administration, the Bureau of Mines, and the Bureau of the Budget.

A comprehensive Manual of Reporting is under preparation and these instructions will constitute part of the special section relating to economic reporting.

B. A detailed plan has been prepared and the necessary recommendations made and approved to bring about noteworthy changes in the present system for evaluating reports received from the field. The necessary organizational machinery has also been worked out to enable the Directors of the Offices of Economic Affairs and of the Foreign Service to assess at any moment the quality and volume of the reporting being done at any particular point in the field and to determine what aspects of this reporting need attention. A considerable increase in staff will be required to carry out these recommendations which have been budgeted for and approved by the Division of Budget and Finance. They will be put into effect as soon as possible.

C. Outstanding individuals in academic, busi-

ness, and government circles have talked to joint committees of the Group. Among those are William Langer, of Harvard; DeWitt Poole, of Princeton; Robert Watt, International Representative of the American Federation of Labor; Jacob Viner, of Yale; James Carey, Secretary-Treasurer of the Congress of Industrial Organizations; Mrs. Vera Micheles Dean, Research Director of the Foreign Policy Association; Senator Joseph Ball; Eric Johnston, President of the United States Chamber of Commerce; and Nelson A. Rockefeller, Coordinator of Inter-American Affairs. These individuals have gained a knowledge of the work and future plans for the Foreign Service and they themselves have presented ideas for the improvement of the Service. As rapidly as feasible, other persons prominent in their respective fields will be asked to work with the Group.

D. Problems have been analyzed and carefully studied and recommendations will soon be formulated by the Group with respect to plans for arrangements to assist in the handling of technical and specialized reporting work of the Foreign Service through the formation of a Foreign Service Officers' Reserve; for concentrated four months' language-instruction courses similar to those developed by the armed forces during the war, which will enable Foreign Service officers to arrive at a new post speaking the language of the country; for the provision of essential and urgently needed "job allowances" for reporting officers; for improvements in the framing of instructions to the field; for in-service and progressive training courses for Foreign Service officers; for an integration of the reporting work of the missions and consulates; for the preparation of a basic Manual of Reporting; and for more effective utilization of the reporting organization and personnel.

Experience to date has shown the value of the Group as a forum where representatives from all divisions of the Department and officials from other interested agencies meet on an informal basis to discuss their common reporting and ancillary problems. The result has been an appreciable improvement in the instructions now being sent to the missions and consulates and a greater awareness, on the part of other agencies, of the Department's reporting problems. It is thus bringing about a better balance in the heavy overall reporting load, together with a diminution in

the excessive reporting demands which were beginning to be made upon the field.

A unique, cooperative, interdepartmental enterprise has been launched composed of Foreign Service officers and other officials aware of the Government's informational needs from abroad, acquainted with the specific problems involved, and familiar with the difficulties facing reporting officers in their daily work. The net results so far have been to raise the reporting "sights" of the Service; to provide more effective guidance to the field; to initiate urgently needed changes to facilitate better reporting work, and to prepare the required plans; and, finally, to restore a necessary self-confidence in the future of the Service which ill-informed attacks and the slow pace of reforms had sapped. This new situation has largely been achieved by telling the Foreign Service: "Study your own problems, state what needs to be done, and action will be taken. The initiative and opportunity are yours."

The one difficulty of utilizing the Group as an adjunct to the planning work is that all the members have heavy priority responsibilities. The progress of the work, therefore, is not so rapid as is desirable. On the other hand, the procedure has enabled the Planning Staff to tap the experience and knowledge of a much wider number of persons than otherwise would be available. It also puts behind the Group's recommendations the support, on a democratic basis, of a large number of officials directly concerned with the problems to be solved. These advantages have greatly outweighed the fact that members can devote only part of their time to the Group's work.

The progress made to date permits the conclusion that the establishment of the Joint Survey Group has been a most timely and effective project which should continue to be of material assistance to the Planning Staff in preparing the Foreign Service for its post-war responsibilities.

## Resolutions Pertaining To Palestine

[Released to the press December 11]

Resolutions pertaining to Palestine have recently been before the appropriate committees of the Con-

gress, and the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations has inquired as to the attitude of the Department of State toward these resolutions.

The Department has the utmost sympathy for the persecuted Jewish people of Europe and has been assisting them through active support of the work of the War Refugee Board and in every other possible way. The Department considers, however, that the passage of the resolutions at the present time would be unwise from the standpoint of the general international situation, and has so informed the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations.

## Visit of the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Panama

### REMARKS BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE<sup>1</sup>

[Released to the press December 12]

MR. MINISTER: It is with the greatest pleasure that I extend to you a warm welcome on behalf of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union.

We are happy to greet the distinguished son of that eminent Panamanian patriot, statesman, diplomat, historian, and man of letters, Samuel Lewis.

As Minister of Foreign Affairs, you are worthily following in his illustrious footsteps. To your family background of loyal and devoted service to the highest interests of Panama, you have added practical experience as member of the National Assembly and in other important positions. You have demonstrated your unswerving devotion to the ideals of liberty and justice. We feel confident, therefore, that this combination of heritage and personal achievement augurs well for a continuance of your country's high standards in the conduct of its relations with the rest of the world.

In extending to you the welcome of the Governing Board, I should like to combine therewith our warmest wishes for the welfare of the President of Panama, and for the progress and prosperity of the people of your country.

<sup>1</sup> Delivered at a special session of the Governing Board of the Pan American Union in honor of the Honorable Samuel Lewis.

## Visit of Indian Scientists

[Released to the press December 11]

A group of seven leading Indian scientists arrived in the United States on December 8 for an eight weeks' tour of the country. The group has just completed a similar visit to Great Britain at the invitation of the British Government; and before returning to India they were anxious to meet with leading American scientists particularly in the fields of physics and chemistry.

The following eminent scientists are included in this group: Dr. Nazir Ahmad, Col. S. L. Bhatia, Sir Shanti Swarup Bhatnagar, Sir Jnan Chandra Ghosh, Prof. S. K. Mitra, Prof. Meghand Saha, and Prof. J. N. Mukherji.

The tour is under the joint auspices of the Indian Agency General, the National Research Council, and the Department of State. Mr. Frank S. Coan, an officer of the Department, has been delegated to accompany the scientists on their tour. The scientists will reside at the Blair-Lee House as guests of the Department during the first part of their Washington stay.

## Visit of Indian Social Scientist

[Released to the press December 16]

Dr. J. M. Kumarappa, who is visiting the United States as the first guest from India of the Department of State under its program of cultural cooperation, arrived in Washington on December 11 for a three-week stay. Dr. Kumarappa is Director of the Tata Institute of Social Sciences at Bombay, India's leading institute for the education and training of workers in social welfare.

Here in the United States in response to an invitation which attracted considerable favorable comment in the newspapers in India, Dr. Kumarappa plans to visit many well-known institutions and centers for social-science study, and also to meet with organizations and persons prominent in the social-science field.

Dr. Kumarappa is residing at the Blair-Lee House during the first part of his stay in Washington as a guest of the Department and has been offered office and library facilities by the Office of Education.

## Welfare of American Citizens In Bulgaria

[Released to the press December 13]

According to a report received by the Department of State from Maynard Barnes, United States Representative at Sofia, the few American nationals who remained in Bulgaria upon the German occupation of that country are apparently unharmed and in good health.

## Death of Herbert Delafield

### STATEMENT BY THE SECRETARY OF STATE

[Released to the press December 12]

I have learned with deep regret of the death today of Herbert Delafield, secretary-manager of the Inter-American Coffee Board. Although Mr. Delafield was not officially an employee of the Department, his work at the Board and the close working relationship he maintained with the coffee industry in this country and in the coffee-producing countries have contributed immeasurably to the successful operation of the Inter-American Coffee Agreement, of which this Government and the governments of the 14 coffee-producing American republics are signatories.

## TREATY INFORMATION

### Naval-Mission Agreement With Venezuela

By an exchange of notes of November 20 and December 9, 1944 between the Governments of the United States and Venezuela, the agreement providing for the assignment of a United States Naval Mission to Venezuela, signed at Washington on March 24, 1941,<sup>1</sup> has been extended for a period of two years. The renewal is effective from March 24, 1945.

<sup>1</sup> Executive Agreement Series 203.



## THE FOREIGN SERVICE

### Confirmations

On December 14, 1944 the Senate confirmed the nomination of Norman Armour as American Ambassador to Spain.

On December 15, 1944 the Senate confirmed the nomination of Hallett Johnson as American Ambassador to Costa Rica.

## THE DEPARTMENT

### Appointment of Officers

William D. Wright as Special Assistant to the Director of the Office of Departmental Administration, effective December 1, 1944.

Emile Despres as Adviser on German Economic Affairs in the Office of Economic Affairs and the Office of Wartime Economic Affairs, effective October 31, 1944. He will continue to serve as Adviser on European Finance, Division of Financial and Monetary Affairs.

### Functions Delegated to Assistant Secretary Acheson<sup>1</sup>

*Purpose.* To delegate to the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Dean Acheson, the functions and authority heretofore exercised by the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Shaw, and the Assistant Secretary, Mr. Berle, as well as to confirm Mr. Acheson's continued exercise of the functions and authority which he has heretofore exercised in the field of economic affairs.

1 *Delegation of authority.* Mr. Dean Acheson, until otherwise directed, shall possess the authority and perform the duties and functions heretofore vested, by departmental order or otherwise, in Mr. Shaw, Mr. Berle, and in Mr. Acheson himself, including all fiscal and certifying authority formerly vested in these officers.

2 *Previous orders.* All orders and instructions inconsistent herewith are hereby revoked.

E. R. STETTINIUS, Jr.

<sup>1</sup> Departmental Order 1300, issued Dec. 13, 1944; effective Dec. 4, 1944.

## PUBLICATIONS

### DEPARTMENT OF STATE

The Proclaimed List of Certain Blocked Nationals: Cumulative Supplement No. 4, December 15, 1944, to Revision VIII of September 13, 1944. 56 pp. Free.

### OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES

The Jewish National Home in Palestine: Supplemental Statements to Hearings Submitted to the Committee on Foreign Affairs, House of Representatives, 78th Cong., 2d sess., on H. Res. 418 and H. Res. 419, Resolutions Relative to the Jewish National Home in Palestine. iii, 129 pp., vii.

First Quarterly Report on UNRRA Expenditures and Operations: Message from the President of the United States transmitting the first Quarterly Report on USNRRRA Expenditures and Operations in accordance with the act of March 28, 1944, authorizing United States Participation in the Work of the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration. H. Doc. 803, 78th Cong. 44 pp.

The articles listed below will be found in the December 16 issue of the Department of Commerce publication entitled *Foreign Commerce Weekly*, copies of which may be obtained from the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, for 10 cents each:

"Australia: The Dramatic Course of Its Wartime Economy", Part II, by Wilson C. Flake, consul, American Consulate General, Sydney, New South Wales.

"Electronics in Argentina", based on a report from David M. Clark, second secretary, American Embassy, Buenos Aires.

"Ecuador's Market for Medicinals", based on a report by John T. Reid, special assistant, American Embassy, Quito.

## LEGISLATION

An Act To authorize the appointment of two additional Assistant Secretaries of State. H. R. 4311. Approved December 8, 1944. Public Law 472, 78th Cong. 1 p.

Foreign Service of the United States. H. Rept. 2028, 78th Cong., on H. R. 5474. 12 pp. [Favorable report.]

Relief of Certain Officers and Employees of the Foreign Service of the United States. H. Rept. 2040, 78th Cong., on H. R. 4988. 23 pp. [Favorable report.]

Extending the Ending Date of the Philippine Insurrection: Hearing Before the Committee on Pensions, United States Senate, 78th Cong., 2d sess., on H. R. 4099, an act to extend the period of the Philippine Insurrection so as to include active service with the United States Military or Naval Forces engaged in hostilities in the Moro Province, including Mindanao, or in the Islands of Samar and Leyte, between July 5, 1902, and December 31, 1913; November 16, 1944. iii, 21 pp.

Extend Date of Philippine Insurrection: Message From

the President of the United States returning, without his approval, the bill (H. R. 4099) to extend the period of the Philippine Insurrection so as to include active service with the United States military or naval forces engaged in hostilities in the Moro Province, including Mindanao, or in the Islands of Samar and Leyte, between July 5, 1902, and December 31, 1913, H. Doc. 804, 78th Cong. 2 pp.

Post-War Economic Policy and Planning: Fifth Report of the House Special Committee on Post-War Economic

Policy and Planning, pursuant to H. Res. 408, a resolution creating a special committee on post-war economic policy and planning. Summary of activities of the special committee. H. Rept. 2071, 78th Cong. ii, 6 pp.

Granting permission for certain employees of the Civil Aeronautics Administration to accept British Empire Medals tendered by the Government of Canada in the name of His Britannic Majesty, King George VI. S. Rept. 1380, 78th Cong., on S. J. Res. 106. 2 pp. [Favorable report.]